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Abstract—This paper aims to provide a framework to model 
human belief and misperception in helicopter overland 
navigation. Helicopter overland navigation is known to be a 
challenging cognitive task, and understanding the cognitive 
processes associated with it is non-trivial. Twelve military 
personnel participated in the study and statistical analysis 
showed that their gaze parameters can be predicted by their level 
of expertise. Some pilots showed common visual misperception 
during the navigation task, which can be explained by the 
following errors: 1) confusion between inference and evidence, 2) 
incorrect mutually exclusive assumptions on the data, and 3) 
biased sampling. Simulation results on two cases observed in the 
experiments are given. Quantitative differences in dynamic 
perceptions between a Bayesian agent and misperceiving humans 
are presented with the suggested modeling framework. 
Keywords - mispercetion; visual perception; Bayesian modeling; 
cognition; navigation 
I.  INTRODUCTION  
In many different disciplines such as psychology, 
neuroscience, and cognitive engineering, research efforts have 
been focused on understanding human perception. For example, 
Brunswikian theory and method (the lens model) has been 
employed to the technological mediation of perception in many 
substantive domains including aviation, military applications, 
and dynamic system, and human-computer interaction [1]. 
Bayesian inference has also been widely used to model many 
different aspects of cognition, such as induction bias [2, 3]. 
Reference [2] showed that a Bayesian framework can model 
biases captured through empirical data. 
Helicopter overland navigation is a complex task that 
requires continuous visual cue perception and decision making 
and is normally assigned to a non-flying pilot. However, how 
the non-flying pilot perceives visual cues in the OTW (out-the-
window) view and how they make a series of navigational 
decisions based on their perceptions is not well understood.   
Most human cognitive modeling techniques assume that 
humans are as reasonable as in a Bayesian framework, i.e., 
following Bayes’ rule: maximizing or minimizing certain 
criteria to update prior knowledge. Such approaches generally 
do not include human errors such as misperception and 
confusion. Although uncertainty parameters in the models can 
be set to capture misperception, it would be very useful to 
understand and model such errors specifically rather than lump 
them into uncertainties.  For example, what are common 
misperceptions, when are these errors made, and how can they 
be modeled quantitatively? Currently, observing a pilot’s 
cognitive state is guesswork and there are few cues available to 
assess it.  If we can monitor when and how misperceptions or 
mistakes are made, this information would have an important 
impact on training effectiveness of student pilots.  Feeding 
misperception information in real time to the instructor pilot 
would help both the instructor to know what is going on and 
the student pilot to realize what is wrong in a specific way. 
Coherence theory [4] illustrates the relationship between 
visual perception, cognition, and human error.  It posits that in 
terms of scene representation, attention shapes a dynamic 
representation of the scene that is strongly influenced by task 
demands and observer expectations.  For example, coherence 
theory can explain visual misperception phenomena of change 
blindness and inattentional blindness.  Change blindness occurs 
when people do not detect changes in scenes that were made 
during blinks, flickers, or disruptions [5].  Inattentional 
blindness [6] occurs when people are overly focused on certain 
aspects of the scene or on a visual task such that that they do 
not see obvious changes, e.g., “Gorillas in our Midst 
experiment” by Simons & Chabris [7].   In the Gorillas in our 
Midst experiment, participants tasked with counting the 
number of passes made by one basketball team during a game 
did not see a person in a gorilla suit walk to the middle of the 
court, beat their chest, and walk off the court.  When these 
visual misperceptions are coupled with an overconfidence bias 
[8], decisions are affected.  
 Research on human error detection modeling [e.g., 9] 
could help understand some types of human error. Some 
approaches [e.g., 10] have tried to integrate different cognitive 
functions. However, visual misperception has not been 
specifically studied in overland navigation.  Thus, we provided 
a formal framework to model human misperception in 
helicopter overland navigation task as our representative 
cognitive task. We monitored pilots’ visual scan patterns, 
tracked their OTW view and navigation performance. The 
navigation task is described in Section II along with a summary 
of statistical analyses on pilots’ visual scan patterns. Section III 
explains in detail the observed visual misperception during the 
navigation task and provides a formal model technique of the 
misperception using a Bayesian framework. Various simulation 
results comparing reasonable Bayesian agents and error-
making humans in two different cases observed in the 
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 experiments are shown in Section IV. Section V summarizes 
the study and provides future research ideas and plans. 
II. OVERLAND NAVIGATION AND EMPIRICAL OBSERVATION 
ON VISUAL PERCEPTION 
The navigation task was to fly over 12 waypoints (indicated 
as black circles on Fig. 1) in a simulated terrain model of 
Twentynine Palms, CA after studying the area utilizing the 
Falcon View flight planning software system. The first 
waypoint is located slightly south of the map so it is not shown 
in Fig. 1. Each waypoint pair has a “doghouse” that indicates 
(from top to bottom): the next waypoint number, the 
recommended heading to reach that waypoint from the 
previous one, the distance between waypoints, and the amount 
of time it takes to traverse the distance assuming a speed of 
about 60 knots.  The task was created to be challenging.   
Waypoints are very close together and the terrain tends to be 
ambiguous, so subjects needed to make course corrections 
based on visual cues from both the OTW and map screens 
(their goal being to bring their perceived location closer to their 
actual location).  Details of the experiments including 
laboratory setting can be found in [11-13].  
Twelve male military personnel, 29 to 40 years of age 
participated in the study. Total flight hours (TFH) ranged from 
0 – 2700.  Minimum skill requirement for the study was 
completion of at least one overland navigation class. Expertise 
effect on the flight performance such as deviation from the 
flight trajectory and visual scan parameters such as dwell 
duration can be found in [11]. In this paper, our focus is on the 
modeling of visual perception/misperception, i.e., how pilots 
match visual cues from OTW to terrain features on the map 
while navigating based on the navigation trajectory and the 
corresponding OTW view we collected.  
Figure 1.  Main flight route showing 2nd – 12th waypoints with corresponding 
doghouses [5] at Twentynine Palms, CA 
One of the typical navigation problems that pilots confront 
can be described as follows. Suppose pilots see the OTW view 
as shown in Fig. 2(a), i.e., hills on both the left and right 
making a valley in view. This type of valley is a very common 
feature in the terrain and a challenge of pilots is to locate 
themselves in the map (Fig.1) based on the OTW terrain 
feature along with their previous cues.  For example, markers A 
and B in Fig. 2(b) are candidate locations corresponding to the 
OTW view of Fig. 2(a). The OTW cue itself is incomplete for 
pilots to decide which valley they are facing. Thus, pilots use 
their previous knowledge or beliefs to decide whether they are 
located either on A or B.  
What we have observed through the experiment suggest 
that pilots (especially with less experience) tend to perceive 
these OTW cues in a biased way, favoring their prior beliefs. 
Instead of making a fair estimate, some pilots seemed to choose 
the location they need to navigate rather than considering other 
possible locations. Some believed what they expected  instead 
of what they saw. Some only sampled visual cues in view 
which are compatible with their current belief and disregarded 
cues that do not fit with their current belief. These visual 
perception patterns were observed through the whole 
navigation experiment, and we decided to model those specific 
visual misperceptions. Section III describes, categorizes and 
models visual misperceptions in Bayesian framework.  
Figure 2.  (a) typical OTW view with hills/valleys and (b) candidate locations 
of the OTW view  
 III. BAYESIAN MODELING OF VISUAL MISPERCEPTION IN A 
HELICOPTER OVERLAND NAVIGATION TASK 
Some expert pilots successfully located waypoint six and 
made a 90 degree left turn into a narrow valley toward 
waypoint seven. However, nine out of twelve pilots missed this 
narrow valley mainly due to a field of view angle limitation. 
Once they passed waypoint six without realizing it, another 
valley appeared on their left. Pilots who missed waypoint six 
made a left turn into this valley believing they were on track.  
As shown in Fig. 3, subject 5 missed waypoint 6 and took a 
left turn into this valley (6') as shown in Fig. 3. Then, he flew 
north of the intended trajectory (7' and 8'), believing he was on 
waypoints 7 and 8. Initially planned waypoints are shown in 
black whereas the subject’s estimation is shown in blue. On his 
way from waypoint 6' to 7', he saw a valley on the right side of 
the flight heading direction in the OTW scene. If he had been 
on track (i.e., between 6 and 7), he would have been 
surrounded by hills and should not have been able to see any 
saddle or valley and his heading would have been much 
different. Even though his gaze data showed that he scanned 
the valley, the pilot did not question his orientation. This 
indicates the pilot rejected the visual cues that were not 
compatible with his current belief, which could not have been 
correct. Thus, the subject did not question his orientation or 
status, indicating that he overweighed those visual cues that fit 
into his hypothesis by giving little attention (subconsciously) to 
cues conflicting with it. This type of bias, carrying over initial 
bias, has also been seen in a cognitive task that tapped 
inductive biases on cultural evolution [2]. 
The visual misperception explained above can be 
understood in Bayesian framework.  Suppose a navigating pilot 
updates his belief and/or confidence on his position whenever 
he sees salient terrain features, i.e., visual cues. The terrain 
features in the pilot’s sights are information (d) provided to the 
pilot, who infers his/her current position (H) based on the data. 
Thus, the probability of a pilot’s current position being at 
waypoint six after seeing a valley (i.e., hills on the left and right) 
can be obtained by applying Bayes’ rule. 
݌ሺܪ|݀ሻ ൌ  ௣ሺௗ|ுሻ·௣ሺுሻ௣ሺௗ|ுሻ·௣ሺுሻା௣ሺௗ|~ுሻ·௣ሺ~ுሻ                  (1) 
where p(H) is the pilot’s belief probability before seeing the 
scene d, (i.e., hills on the left and right), p(d|H) is the 
conditional probability that the pilot sees the scene when pilot 
is at waypoint six, and p(d|~H) is the conditional probability 
that the pilot sees the same scene when the pilot is in the other 
valley. For simplicity, we only consider two possible 
hypotheses: locations 6 and 6', i.e., H and ~H respectively, as 
described in the previous paragraph. Then, we have p(~H) = 
1 p(H). Both valleys have hills on the left and right, and the 
pilot is equally likely to see the terrain features when the pilot 
is at waypoint six (H) or in the other valley (~H).  Then, 
         ݌ሺ݀|ܪሻ ൌ  ݌ሺ݀|~ܪሻ                          (2) 
If a pilot realizes this fact, his posterior belief p(H|d) should 
be unchanged from his prior belief p(H).  An elementary 
calculation yields p(H|d) = p(H) from Bayes’ rule. However, 
our experiments showed that the initial bias not only carried on 
as shown in [2], but also amplified favoring the initial bias.  
Figure 3.  Subject 5’s actutal flight trajectory (blue) and planned route (black) 
This bias was especially obvious for less experienced pilots; 
they seemed to believe what they expected to see instead of 
what they actually saw. This misperception can be explained 
by three human errors. First, pilots experienced confusion 
between inference p(H|d) and evidence p(d|H) especially when 
p(d|H) is high. Because pilots already believed that they were 
on-track and the scene was a very likely cue, i.e., p(d|H) ≈ 1, 
they approximated p(H|d) ≈ p(d|H) ≈ 1, which is not a correct 
estimation. These pilots chose an easy, inaccurate 
approximation instead of inferring in a non-biased manner. 
This confusion pushed the initial bias the wrong way. 
Second, pilots could incorrectly assume mutually exclusive 
events from the evidence, i.e., p(d|~H) =1 – p(d|H)  as opposed 
to the correct assumption shown in Eq. (2) p(d|H) = p(d|~H) ≈ 
1. The terrain feature they see is neither a unique nor an 
exclusive visual cue, rather it has multiple solutions. However, 
pilots sometimes overweighed the visual cue favoring their 
initial bias: they did not consider the possibility of the visual 
cue being from another valley (~H). 
Third, pilots sampled data in a biased manner as in 
inattentional blindness [6]. They disregarded cues which were 
not compatible with their current belief. They did not update 
their belief when the OTW view included visual cues 
incompatible with their current hypothesis. However, when 
they were given a compatible cue, they used the cue to solidify 
their possibly wrong hypothesis as shown in the two previous 
misperception types. Table I summarizes visual misperception 
modeling introduced in this section.   
TABLE I.  VISUAL PERCEPTION AND MISPERCEPTION MODELING 
Perception 




݌ሺ݀|ܪሻ · ݌ሺܪሻ ൅ ݌ሺ݀|~ܪሻ · ݌ሺ~ܪሻ 
Misperception 
Type 1 (B1) ݌ሺܪ|݀ሻ ൌ ݌ሺ݀|ܪሻ                               when ݌ሺ݀|ܪሻ ≈ 1 
Misperception 
Type 2 (B2) ݌ሺܪ|݀ሻ ൌ
௣ሺௗ|ுሻ·௣ሺுሻ
௣ሺௗ|ுሻ·௣ሺுሻାሺଵି௣ሺௗ|ுሻሻ·௣ሺ~ுሻ  when ݌ሺ݀|ܪሻ ≈ 1 
Misperception 
Type 3 (B3) ݌ሺܪ|݀ሻ ൌ ݌ሺܪሻ                                   when ݌ሺ݀|ܪሻ ≈ 0 
IV. DECISION BIAS SIMULATION: BAYESIAN AGENT VS. 
MISPERCEIVING HUMAN 
Based on experimental observation, misperception 
modeling in a Bayesian framework was introduced in the 
previous section. Simulation results with the modeling 
framework are given in this section. Our objective is to 
quantify human misperception evolving over time and to 
simulate the gap between a series of “misperceptions” and 
“correct decisions.” A correct decision is assumed to adapt 
Bayes’ rule with non-biased samplings of data. We use the 
following notation in this section: A = always correct agent, 
i.e., a Bayesian agent who always adapts Bayes’ Rule to update 
its inferential probability, B = misperceiving human, i.e., an 
agent who uses misperception models introduced in Table I to 
update its inferential probability. 
A. Case 1: single point inference update 
Let’s first examine the case introduced in the beginning of 
Section III: Nine out of twelve pilots missed waypoint 6 due to 
a view angle limitation. Once they passed waypoint 6 without 
realizing it, another valley appeared on their left. Pilots who 
missed waypoint six made left turns into this valley believing 
they were on-track. 
We can assume the prior inference p(H) at waypoint 5 was 
high (for example, .9) because the subject’s actual position as 
well as perception was rational and on-track.  Then, the OTW 
visual cue including hills on the left and right appeared which 
is very likely to be a cue for both H and ~H., i.e., p(d|H) = 
p(d|~H) = .95.  As stated in Section III, posterior probability 
does not change from prior when applying Bayes’ rule. Thus, 
agent A’s p(H) remains the same even after seeing the visual 
cue. However, misperception occurs in agent B, which results 
in increasing p(H).  Fig. 4(a) shows prior and posterior 
inferential probabilities of agents A and Bs respectively. Agent 
A’s probability does not change after seeing the visual cue, 
whereas agent B1 and B2’s probability increased according to 
the misperception type they adapted. 
Fig. 4(b) compares biased sampling and Bayesian 
perception when given a very unlikely cue for H but not so 
much for ~H, i.e.,  p(d|H) =.1 and p(d|H) =.5. Agent B3 
disregards the cue which is not compatible with the prior and 
keeps the prior as the posterior inferential probability. 
However, agent A applied Bayes’ rule and updated its 
inference from .9 to .643.  
 
Figure 4.  Differences in posterior inferential probabilities given same priors. 
A: Bayesian agent, B1: Misperception type 1, B2: Misperception type 2, B3: 
Misperception type 3. 
 
Fig. 4(a) shows a case when the prior p(H) and p(d|H) = 
p(d|~H) were set to fixed values, i.e., .9 and .95. Fig. 5 
describes differences between agent A, B1 and B2’s inferential 
probabilities when the prior p(H) changes from 0 to 1. The 
visual cue used in this simulation was a cue which is highly 
plausible and non-unique, i.e., p(d|H) = p (d|~H) = .95. The 
OTW visual cues shown at waypoint 6 and 6' fall into this 
category, which are common cues that pilots encounter while 
navigating. The x axis represents the prior probability and the y 
axis represents the posterior probability, i.e., updated belief 
after seeing a visual cue. Agent A’s prior and posterior 
probabilities are the same when applying Bayes’ rule. Thus, the 
blue line with a slope of 1 indicates agent A’s posterior 
probability is a function of prior probability, i.e., y=x. When 
subjects confuse evidence p(d|H) with inference p(H|d), then 
the posterior inferential probability becomes constant (=p(d|H)) 
regardless of the prior p(H). This is misperception type 1 and is 
shown as a red dashed line in Fig. 5. As shown in Fig. 5(a), 
B1’s posterior inference is constant (p(d|H) = .95), and the 
misperception is mostly higher than the reasonably induced 
probability. Fig. 5(b) shows misperception type 2 (i.e., p(d|H) 
+ p(d|~H) = 1)  which  is even more biased than misperception 
type 1; this misperception is always higher than A’s perception. 
Posterior perceptions of all three agents (A, B1 and B2) are 
compared in Fig. 5(c). For example, when the prior probability 
was = .7, the posterior probability of A remained the same 
whereas B1 increased to .95 and B2 to .978. This simulation 
shows that the suggested modeling framework can quantify 
human visual misperception compared to a Bayesian agent. Fig. 
5(d) examines a case when p(d|H) > p(d|~H), which can 
happen in a real situation. This is when the visual cue shown d 
is more likely cue of H than ~H, e.g., p(d|H) = .95, p(d|H)  
p(d|~H) = .3. In this case, agent A'’s posterior probability is 
slightly increased as shown in a black line compared to the 
straight 45 degree line of A’s. Agent B’s perceptions are the 
same as in the previous paragraph. Even with more likely cues 
given to pilots, misperceived posterior probabilities (both B1 
and B2) are higher than a reasonably induced posterior. 
 
 
Figure 5.  Differences in posterior inferential probabilities when the prior 
changes from 0 to 1. A: Bayesian agent, A': Bayesian agent with more likely 
visul cue, B1: Misperception type 1, and B2: Misperception type 2 
Different visual cues can also result in variance in 
posteriors. In Fig. 5, the visual cue fidelity p(d|H) was set 
to .95. Fig. 6(a) shows simulation results when given low, 
medium, and high fidelity cues. The visual cue fidelity p(d|H) 
was defined .3, .5, and .9 respectively and shown in red dashed 
lines. As described earlier, misperception type 1 is a constant 
value depending on the cue fidelity. Thus, it seems pilots tend 
to favor the prior when given high fidelity cues whereas they 
reject the cue (biased sampling) when given low fidelity cues. 
(Table I summarized misperception type 1 occurs when p(d|H) 
is high and type 3 when p(d|H) is low.) In the case of 
misperception type 2, pilots favor prior probabilities more than 
agent A whenever p(d|H) > 0.5. Fig. 6(b) simulation results 
shows when p(d|H) is .6, .8, and .95. 
 
B. Case 2: waypoint 58, mispercetion progress modeling   
Fig. 3 showed a result trajectory of visual misperception 
which occurred in the overland navigation task. We can model 
the subject’s misperception progress using the Bayesian 
misperception modeling framework. Case 1 demonstrated 
misperception modeling in a single point whereas this case 
(Case 2) exhibits dynamic evolution of a series of 
misperceptions in agent Bs and gaps between a correct agent A.  
 
 
Figure 6.  Differences in posterior inferential probabilities with different data 
fidelity p(d|H). A: Bayesian agent, B1: Misperception type 1, and B2: 
Misperception type 2 
Figure 7.  Subject 5’s key perceptual situations T1T6 along the actual flight 
trajectory. 
Reviewing the flight session of subject 5 with the FEST 
(Flight and Eye Scan visualization Tool) developed with this 
study [11, 12], we were able to locate the following key 
situations which can affect perception update as shown in Fig. 
7: T1 = initial position at waypoint 5, T2 = vicinity of true 
waypoint 6, T3 = waypoint 6' with a valley shown in OTW 
view, T4 = another valley shown in OTW view, T5 = waypoint 
7', and T6 = waypoint 8'. Fig. 7 shows the key points along 
with the actual flight trajectory introduced in Fig. 3. 
This dynamic evolution of Bayesian perception and 
misperception along the flight trajectory is shown in Fig. 8. The 
x-axis represents key situations, i.e., discrete time events, and 
the y-axis is the updated inferential probability after passing the 
key points. At T1, subject 5 was actually at waypoint 5 
believing he was on-track. Thus, we can suppose prior p(H) is 
relatively high, e.g., .8. H defines whether the pilot is on-track, 
thus, p(H) is high when human perception and actual situation 
agrees. For example, p(H) ~ .5  indicates that navigation 
confidence is very low and p(H) ~.1 indicates that the subject 
thinks he is off-track.  At T2, the valley on waypoint 6 was not 
in OTW view, and the subject did not realize it. We can model 
all agents’ posterior probabilities the same up to T2 as shown 
in Fig. 8. Up to this point, there exists no gap between agents A 
and Bs. At T3, the valley on the left is in sight in OTW view, 
and agent A, B1, and B2 update their probabilities accordingly 
with a cue p(d|H) = p(d|~H) = .95. As shown in the previous 
section, agent A’s probability remains the same whereas those 
of B1 and B2 increase to .95 and .987. At T4, a valley on the 
right was in sight, however, the pilot did not process this cue 
internally, which was a misperception type 3 (biased-
sampling.) Thus, agent B1’s and B2’s perception remains the 
same applying misperception type 3 (B1 and B2 becomes 
B1&B3 and B2&B3 respectively), whereas agent A’s 
perception is updated with p(d|H) = .1.  The p(d|H) is set to 
low because the valley on the right is not a possible visual cue 
if on-track. Thus, agent A’s posterior at T4 decreased to .308 
by applying Bayes’ rule. The perception gaps between agents 
A and Bs are almost .7, suggesting agent A at least doubts its 
position or thinks it is off-track whereas agent B strongly 
believes it is on-track. At T5 and T6, visual cues similar to T2 
are in sight and each agent updates its probability accordingly. 
The combination of three different misperception types 
aggravated the gap between agent A and B’s perceptions. 
 
Figure 8.  Dynamic evolution of perecptions. A: Bayesian agent, B1: 
Misperception type 1, B2: Misperception type 2, and and B3: Misperception 
type 3. T1T6: key situations. 
V. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
We provided a formal modeling method to simulate visual 
misperception in overland navigation using Bayesian 
framework. Numerical simulation results based on 
experimental observation showed that our suggested modeling 
method can quantify visual misperception and compare with a 
Bayesian agent. This modeling technique can help explain 
errors found in an empirical investigation and be applied 
toward developing training navigation systems.  
Our next research goal is to validate our model through 
another set of experiments in the same simulated environment.  
Developing training navigation systems and applying 
Brunswikian theory in the whole system will follow after that. 
We expect this misperception modeling technique to extend to 
any visual stimuli-based tasks such as terrain association, 
gesture recognition, etc.  
We want to augment our model by including map view to 
capture recovery strategies of pilots. In one of the experts’ 
example, the subject’s debrief comments indicated that when 
faced with unexpected terrain features in view, his alternative 
possible location was based on map scan in the vicinity of 
recently-covered terrain.  Although the subject was mistaken in 
the assumption that he was off course, he could not have 
mismatched terrain in view with a plausible alternative location 
if he had not been comparing terrain covered against multiple 
possible locations on the map.  Without this robust hypothesis 
generation and testing, including terrain recently covered, it 
would not have been possible for the subject to identify the 
point at which he thought he had made the turn early.  Of the 
expert navigators in this study, two made minor errors and 
corrected themselves, and each described similar structures for 
recovery in debrief comments. Modeling this recovery strategy 
in our model will help improve visual perception in overland 
navigation. 
As promising as the results appear, some of the aspects in 
our study can be improved in further research. First, integrating 
a vision recognition algorithm on the OTW view to identify 
series of visual cues available to pilots will help develop a 
human visual misperception detection system.  We used FEST 
to review visual cues along the flight trajectory in our study. 
However, if we can automate this process using the 
aforementioned vision recognition algorithm, that will be 
useful for implementing our visual misperception modeling 
framework in field settings. Second, we need to investigate 
how pilots interpret cues with medium fidelity. Our 
misperception modeling simulation results agree with 
experimental observations with high and low fidelity cues. 
However, we did not study misperceptions occurring when 
given medium fidelity cues. Third, dynamic evolution of visual 
misperception can be more formally established as a Bayesian 
Network introduced as applied in [14].  
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